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5. Formalism and state secrets 
SudhaSetty 
INTRODUCTION* 
The state secrets privilege has received a tremendous amount of scholarly 
attention in the US in the last decade, initially prompted by the 
administration of President George W. Bush seeking early dismissals of 
lawsuits that dealt with allegations of serious constitutional and human 
rights violations. 1 The administration's litigation posture was troubling -
but the judicial acceptance of these claims, largely based on the judi-
ciary's own formalistic view of its own role in engaging the executive 
branch on national security secrecy2 - allowed the executive branch to 
make virtually unilateral secrecy determinations that shielded it from 
civil suits. 
In September 2009 the Obama administration created a new policy that 
mandated a more tigorous internal administrative review prior to invok-
ing the state secrets privilege. 3 In the years since the new policy took 
effect, it appears as though this internal review process has resulted in 
little difference with regard to the invocation of the privilege at the 
* This chapter is drawn from a previous work: Sudha Setty, Judicial 
Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1629 
(2012). 
1 Press Release, Office of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy Introduces 
State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
available at 2008 WLNR 1256008; e.g., William G. Weaver and Robert M. 
Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 PoL. Sci. Q. 85, 100 (2005) 
(claiming that the Bush administration is using the state secrets privilege with 
'offhanded abandon'). 
2 E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit seeking damages for extraordinary 
rendition and torture upon upholding the government's invocation of the state 
secrets privilege). 
3 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., on Policies and 
Procedures Governing Invocating of the State Secrets Privilege to Heads of Exec. 
57 
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pleadings stage in cases that allege torture and other human rights 
abuses.4 
One high-profile case, that of Binyam Mohamed and other plaintiffs 
claiming that they had been subject to extraordinary rendition, torture, 
and prolonged detention, offers evidence of a disturbing trend of US 
courts retreating to formalistic reasoning5 to extend unwarranted defer-
ence to the executive branch in security-related6 contexts.? In this chapter, 
I consider the state secrets privilege and place the formalist decision-
making of the Mohamed court in juxtaposition with other nations' 
jurisprudence - including the English courts that dealt with a separate 
Dep'ts & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], (estab-
lishing layers of internal review regarding invocations of the state secrets 
privilege). 
4 See Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State 
Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 257-8 (2009) (identifying the 
continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations in their approach to the 
state secrets privilege). 
5 I use judicial formalism to refer to a methodology that gives primacy to 
narrow rule-following rather than consideration of the role of the courts to act in 
a way that is infused with morality when necessary to preserve individual rights. 
See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612-16 
(1999) (describing one form of formalism as 'apurposive mle-following'). Justice 
Antonin Scalia has supported use of a formal approach to maximize stability and 
credibility in the Supreme Court's decision making, opining that a 'discretion-
confening approach is ill suited ... to a legal system in which the supreme court 
can review only an insignificant propo1iion of the decided cases'. See Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178 
(1989). 
6 Cass Sunstein has offered three categories of judicial decision-making in 
wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer broadly to execu-
tive branch claims of Article II authority; liberty maximalism, in which courts 
maintain a peacetime approach to constitutional liberty questions; and minimal-
ism, in which courts use a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh 
security and liberty interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50-52 (2004). I suggest that Mohamed and similar decisions 
should be conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow adherence to 
procedures and rules as a means of enabling deference to executive claims and 
avoiding meaningful engagement in underlying civil liberties concems. 
7 E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing suit seeking 
damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon a fmding that constitutional 
and international law obligations did not apply); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 20 10) (dismissing suit seeking injunctive relief for the listing 
of plaintiff's son on the US targeted killings list based on standing and political 
question grounds). 
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lawsuit brought by Mohamed there. This case exemplifies the US shift 
away from the flexible, rule of law-oriented approach that courts in the 
United Kingdom and Israel take, and toward the formalistic rigidity that 
the Indian Supreme Court often employs in government secrecy cases.8 
Given the Obama administration's aggressive invocation of the state 
secrets privilege and the judiciary's unwillingness to defend the ability of 
individuals to litigate their basic human and civil rights, I conclude that 
for meaningful change to occur, the United States Congress must 
re-introduce state secrets reform legislation that infuses the litigation 
process with procedural and substantive fairness,9 and that courts must 
step away from judicial formalism and instead take on the complex and 
difficult task of providing a venue for government accountability. 
1. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE STATE 
SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
In his prefatory language to the Obama administration's 2009 state 
secrets policy, Attorney General Eric Holder emphasizes that the policy's 
goals include 'provid[ing] greater accountability and reliability in the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation ... [and] strengthen-
[ing] public confidence that the U.S. government will invoke the privilege 
in comt only when genuine and significant harm to national defense or 
foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent necessary to safeguard 
those interests' .10 The policy also includes important limitations such as a 
prohibition against using the privilege to conceal violations of the law or 
prevent embanassment to the government.11 Unfortunately, the promise 
8 These four nations - the United States, England, Israel and India - are 
useful comparators because of their shared common law traditions and the shared 
roots of evidentiary privileges such as the state secrets privilege in English law 
and policy. 
9 'Congress's reform attempts, albeit unsuccessful, have attempted to 
improve procedural and substantive justice for plaintiffs. See, e.g., 154 CONG. 
REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy on the State 
Secrets Protection Act). 
10 Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1. 
11 Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The rest of the policy establishes 
the layers of review with the Department of Justice with regard to satisfying the 
procedural requirements for invoking and defending the privilege. These proced-
ural requirements are first laid out in the seminal US state secrets case of United 
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-8, 10-11 (1953). For an in-depth account of 
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of these reforms has not yet been fulfilled, as the case of Binyam 
Mohamed exemplifies. 
In Mohamed, the Northern District of California dismissed a suit 
brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary allegedly involved 
in the transportation of the detainees for government-directed rendition 
and torture. 12 Binyam Mohamed, a British resident, claimed that he 
traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 to escape a lifestyle that led to drug 
addiction in England. 13 US authorities alleged that Mohamed trained with 
the Taliban in Afghanistan to prepare for an attack within the US. 
Mohamed was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 and claims he was detained 
and tortured in various locations under US control until February 2009, 
when he was released without charge. 14 Mohamed and similarly situated 
plaintiffs filed suit in 2007 against Jeppesen Dataplan, the Boeing 
subsidiary that operated detainee transport airplanes to and from deten-
tion centers. 15 
In granting the govemment's motion to dismiss, the district court used 
the same reasoning that other US courts dealing with the privilege have 
relied upon, 16 primarily the need to dismiss the suit because the subject 
matter at issue- the govemment's extraordinary rendition program- was 
itself a state secret that could jeopardize national security interests if 
revealed. 17 A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, rejecting the government's 
claims that the suit needed to be dismissed outright based on its subject 
matter. 18 The administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit to hear the 
case en bane, where it prevailed in having Mohamed's suit dismissed. 
the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: 
UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006). 
12 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
13 Profile: Binyam Mohamed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009), http:// 
news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/7870387 .stm. 
14 Id. Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded, and suffered cuts on his 
genit11ls with a scalpel by his captors. 
15 Amended Complaint at 1-6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2798). 
16 E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing based on the state secrets privilege a 
suit in which plaintiff alleged extraordinary rendition and torture). 
17 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-36 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
18 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997, 1009 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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2. FORMALISM IN JEPPESEN 
The Ninth Circuit en bane dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in a formalistic 
opinion that failed to acknowledge the reality of the gross human rights 
abuses that plaintiffs suffered. The majority began its evaluation of the 
government's invocation of the privilege by finding that the procedural 
requirements were met and that the information is privileged. 19 The court 
then reasoned that it is obligated to dismiss a suit if it appeared that 
privileged information would be necessary to litigate the case.20 The 
majority found that even if plaintiffs were able to prove their case relying 
solely on publicly available evidence, dismissal of the suit was still 
warranted because Jeppesen Dataplan would have found it difficult to 
mount a defense without implicating privileged material.21 It is particu-
larly ironic that the majority, while claiming to have struggled with the 
tension between human rights and security concerns, ultimately retreated 
to rigid and formalist reasoning that turned on its concern that a company 
allegedly complicit in the torture of innocent civilians is able to 
adequately defend itself in a civil matter.22 
The majority opinion abdicated its structural responsibility to uphold 
the rule of law and check govemment abuse, instead offering only hollow 
platitudes and unlikely avenues for redress: at one point the court 
conjectures that the executive branch may decide someday to compensate 
the victims of the extraordinary rendition program, akin to the compen-
sation for the rendition and internment of individuals of Japanese descent 
during World War Il.23 At other points, the court bizanely shifted 
responsibility to Congress to provide redress to plaintiffs, noting that 
19 Id. at 1080, 1085-6 (relying on the test articulated in United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)). 
20 Id. at 1083. 
21 Id. at 1089-90. 
22 The veracity of the plaintiffs' claims about Jeppesen Dataplan's complicity 
in the torture is not factored into the majority opinion, a point raised by the 
dissent. See id. at 1095 n 5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former 
Jeppesen employees understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted 
in the torture of detainees). 
23 Id. at 1091. It is remarkable that the majority considered the reparations 
awarded to Japanese internees during World War II as a potentially appropl'iate 
model of compensation. Those reparations came decades after the harm to the 
internees, and only after a national soul-searching as to how such poor national 
security policy was validated by all branches of government and the public. 
Further, hearkening back to the internment evokes comparisons to the deferential 
fonnalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which most 
62 Secrecy, national security and the vindication of constitutional law 
Congress has the power to investigate government abuses, could enact 
private bills to compensate the plaintiffs or take up state secrets reform.24 
The dissent by Judge Hawkins included a critique of the narrowness of 
the majority opinion, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of 
Jeppesen Dataplan's role in rendition and torture, and that the majority's 
failure to give weight to these claims undermines an appropriate ana-
lysis.25 Judge Hawkins observed that the majority 'disregard[ed] the 
concept of checks and balances' and abdicated its responsibility by 
suggesting that the executive or Congress should act to provide compen-
sation, characterizing the majority's suggestion regarding reparations as 
'elevat[ing] the impractical to the point of absurdity' and noting the need 
to preserve an avenue for the tortured plaintiffs to seek redress in the 
courts if possible.26 
3. FORMALISM IN THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
The Supreme Court established the standard for evaluating a claim of the 
state secrets privilege in thtb 1950s, drawing from English precedent 
during World War II. English public interest immunity, used akin to the 
state secrets privilege, evolved in a different direction than that of the 
U.S. since that time; this dynamic is illustrated clearly in the contem-
poraneous treatment of Binyam Mohamed's lawsuit in the English courts. 
To further contextualize the analysis of judicial formalism in the appli-
cation of the privilege, I briefly consider how Israel and India deal with 
questions of state secrecy during litigation.27 
3.1 England 
English courts generally afford high levels of deference to government 
officials claiming public interest immunity,28 although the 2009 and 2010 
modern commentators view as a profound failure of the judiciaty to uphold the 
rule of law and curb abuses by the national security state. 
24 Id. at 1091-92. 
25 Id. at 1095-96. 
26 Id. at 1101. 
27 India and Israel are useful comparators as functioning democracies with 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers and serious ongoing national 
security threats, and, like the US in the context of the state secrets privilege, 
derive some legal processes from the United Kingdom. 
28 See Air Canada v. Sec'y of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 395 (Eng.) 
(stating that when a government official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to 
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decisions in the case of Binyam Mohamed illustrate a potential shift. The 
backdrop of the English litigation in Mohamed relates to proceedings in 
the US. In May 2008, the US charged Mohamed under the Military 
Commissions Act29 with conspiracy to commit terrorism,30 relying on 
confessions which Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of 
torture. 31 Mohamed began proceedings in English courts seeking release 
of evidence in the possession of the British government that the US had 
compiled against Mohamed. In August 2008, a court ruled in Mohamed's 
favor,32 but redacted a summary of intelligence gleaned from US 
intelligence sources after the Foreign Secretary issued a public interest 
immunity certificate claiming that state secrets were at issue.33 
The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division reconsidered in 
early 2009 whether the public interest immunity certificate issued by the 
Foreign Secretary was compelling.34 The public interest immunity certifi-
cate asserted that the summary report must remain undisclosed because 
the US government had threatened to 're-evaluate its intelligence sharing 
relationship with the United Kingdom' and possibly withhold vital 
national security information from the United Kingdom should the 
summary be disclosed to Mohamed's attorneys. 35 
The English court laid out the test for balancing the public interest in 
national security and the public interest in 'open justice, the rule of law 
the need for the public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute 
deference). 
29 10 u.s.c. §§ 948-50 (2006). 
30 This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined the 
prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through 
torture. See William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detain-
ees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/ 
22gitmo.html?adxnnl=l&adxnnlx=1328130327-WTFk:Fvw3ue0Rn9QlvAuLHQ. 
31 Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] 
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]-[47] (Eng.). 
32 Id. at [105]. 
33 Id. at [150]-[160]. 
34 The court noted that the information in question was '7 very shmt 
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines' of text which summarized reports by the 
US govemment to British intelligence services on the treatment of Mohamed 
during his detention in Pakistan. See Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & 
Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.). 
35 Id. at [62]. See Glenn Greenwald, Obama Administration Threatens Britain 
to Keep Torture Evidence Concealed, SALON.COM (May 12, 2009), www.salon. 
com/2009/05/12/obama_1 01. 
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and democratic accountability' .36 The test involved balancing the public 
interest in disclosure of the information and the possibility of serious 
harm to a public interest such as national security if disclosure is made, 
and determining whether national security interests can be protected by 
means other than nondisclosure.37 
Considering factors in support of disclosing the information, the court 
noted the need to uphold the rule of law,38 comport with international and 
supranational standards,39 ensure that allegations of serious criminality 
are not inappropriately dismissed,40 maintain accountability over the 
government,41 and protect the public and media interest in disclosure 
of government activities.42 The court also appeared surprised that the 
U.S. government was apparently intetfering in a matter of the rule of law 
and government accountability in another country.43 Nonetheless, the 
court relied on its long-standing precedent of deference to the executive 
branch in matters of national security44 and upheld the Foreign Secre-
tary's issuance of the public interest immunity certificate.45 
However, in October 2009 the court reversed its previous decision to 
withhold the information regarding Mohamed's treatment.46 The court 
36 Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18] (Eng.) (noting that this case 
revolved around a question of the rule of law, not around the rights of an 
individual litigant). 
37 Id. at [34] (citing Regina v. H, [2004] 2 AC 134 (HL) [36(3)] (Eng.)). 
38 Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18]-[19] (Eng.). 
39 See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [20]-[21], [26], [30], [101]-
[105]. 
40 Id. at [26(iv)], [26(ix)]. 
41 Id. at [32]. 
42 Id. at [37] ('Where there is no publicity there is no justice ... There is no 
greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover 
of mles of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves' (quoting Scott v. 
Scott, [1913] AC 417 (HL) 477 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline) (appeal taken from 
EWCA (Civ) (UK)). 
43 Id. at [69]. 
44 See id. at [63]-[67]. However, the court noted that such deference needed 
to be limited to instances of genuine national security, and not cases in which 'it 
appears that while disclosure of the material may cause embarrassment or arouse 
criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence interest'. Id. at [66] 
(quoting R. v. Shayler, [2003] AC 247 (HL) 272 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) 
(appeal taken from EWCA (Crim) (UK)). 
45 I d. at [79]. 
46 Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] 
EWHC (Admin) 2653, [7] (Eng.) (noting that reopening of a case should be done 
in 'exceptional circumstances' if necessary in the 'interests of justice'). 
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reasoned that there was an extremely low likelihood that the Obama 
administration would actually withhold intelligence from the United 
Kingdom,47 and noted that 'a vital public interest requires, for reasons of 
democratic accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, 
that a summary of the most important evidence relating to the involve-
ment of the British security services in wrongdoing be placed in the 
public domain in the United Kingdom' .48 
The October 2009 decision ultimately rejected formalistic reasoning in 
favor of maintaining the rule of law, open justice and the possibility of 
public accountability. In February 2010, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
divisional court's decision, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of 
torture.49 Specifically, the appellate decision looked to dicta in the US 
habeas corpus matter of Mohammed v. Obama.50 In that case, Judge 
Kessler weighed the habeas corpus petition of detainee Farhi Saeed bin 
Mohammed and considered evidence proffered by the government that 
Binyam Mohamed, while in detention at Guantanamo Bay, told the 
government that bin Mohammed had trained with him at an al-Qaeda 
base.51 Judge Kessler described the harrowing detention and torture of 
Binyam Mohamed while in US custody that rendered his testimony 
regarding bin Mohammed unreliable and inadmissible.52 She further 
noted that '[t]he Government does not challenge or deny the accuracy of 
Binyam Mohamed's story of brutal treatment' .53 
The English Court of Appeal used this revelation as one basis for 
upholding the order for the UK government to disclose information 
47 Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104]. The court noted that the objections made by 
the Obama administl'ation to disclosing the information in question were not as 
strong as the threats made by the Bush administration. 
48 ld. at [105]. 
49 Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010] 
EWCA (Civ) 158, [2011] QB 218 (Eng.). See Adam Tomkins, National Security 
and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 215, 229 (2011) 
(noting that allegations of horrific torture weighed significantly in the comi's 
decision-making). 
50 Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). This citation 
refers to the de-classified opinion that was made publicly available on December 
16, 2009. The original version of the opinion, dated November 19, 2009, is cited 
at Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2009). 
51 Mohamed, 704 F. Supp 2d. at 2, 18-19. 
52 Id. at 20-23, 29. 
53 Id. at 24. 
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regarding Mohamed's mistreatment. 54 This willingness of the English 
Court of Appeal to engage in a realist analysis serves as a sharp contrast 
to the Ninth Circuit en bane decision in Mohamed, where the majority 
does not appear to concern itself with evidence of the veracity of 
Mohamed's claims and instead limits itself to an overly formalistic 
interpretation of the state secrets privilege.55 
3.2 Israel 
Israeli courts, like their English counterparts, offer an example of how 
the courts balance imperatives of security with the rule of law when they 
refuse to accept a narrow interpretation of their own role. Courts, akin to 
the English reasoning in the Mohamed case, use a flexible, realist 
approach to analyzing these questions, giving significant weight to 
plaintiffs' allegations of human rights violations. In Israel almost any 
complaint against the executive branch is considered justiciable.56 
Although justiciability is no guarantee of ultimate success in litigation 
against the government, the institutionalization of hearing such cases 
reflects, at its best, a judicial willingness of the courts to engage in 
critical thinking about government claims regarding nfttional security. 
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel,57 plaintiffs 
challenged the preventative strikes undertaken by the Israeli military in 
response to alleged terrorist attacks based on the ensuing loss of civilian 
life and Israel's intemational law obligations. As an initial matter, the 
court considered a challenge by the government that the suit was not 
justiciable based on national security concerns.58 The Israeli Supreme 
54 Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
[2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 [138], [2011] QB 218 (Eng.). 
55 1n fact, the only reference to Judge Kessler's decision comes in a footnote 
referencing the Mohammed case, in which the court notes that Binyam Moham-
ed's allegations have been discussed elsewhere. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.l (9th Cir. 2010). 
56 Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 153 (2002) ('Our Supreme Court 
- which in Israel serves as the court of first instance for complaints against the 
executive branch - opens its doors to anyone with a complaint about the 
activities of a public authority.'). 
57 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005] (Isr.), 
available at http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007 I A34/02007690.a34. 
pdf. 
58 Id. at 5 ~ 9 (arguing against justiciability, the government cites Israeli High 
Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister 56(3) 
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Court applied a four-pronged test to determine justiciability, reasoning 
that a case involving the impingement of human rights is always 
justiciable;59 that a case in which the central issue is one of political or 
military policy and not a legal dispute is not justiciable;60 that an issue 
that has already been decided by international courts and tribunals to 
which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable in Israel's domestic courts; 
and that judicial review is most appropriate in an ex post situation.61 
In this case, the Israeli Supreme Court found that the claims were 
clearly justiciable.62 Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that 
the targeted killings at issue were not per se illegal, but that they must be 
evaluated on an individual basis.63 Although the holding in Public 
Committee Against Torture raises important and conceming questions as 
to the substantive justice of these decisions, a baseline structural benefit 
exists in having access to courts for grievances involving allegations of 
human rights violations. 
3.3 India 
Whereas England and Israel illustrate the ability of courts to utilize a rule 
of law analysis, India represents a hard line of formalism that the US is at 
risk of veering toward. Indian courts have historically granted the utmost 
deference to the executive branch as to when national security policy 
should be disclosed.64 When cases raise issues of individual rights being 
[2002], for the proposition that 'the choice of means of war employed by [the 
government] in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they happen, 
is not among the subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene'). 
59 HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 34-35 '][50 
[2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il!files_eng/02/690/007/A34/ 
02007690.a34.pdf (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def. 33(2) Isr SC 113, 
124 (Isr.)). 
60 Id. at 35 §51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) Isr SC 210, 218 
[1993] (Isr.)). 
61 Id. at 36 §§ 53-4. 
62 Id. at 1-2 §§1-3. 
63 Id at 41-2 § 63. This decision is particularly notable given the recent 
decision dismissing a suit challenging the U.S. targeted killing program. See 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on 
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the US government from 
keeping his son, US citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list). 
64 E.g., State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 SC 865 (India) 
(carving out national security as the area in which the Prime Minister can 
unilaterally decide what information to disclose); see Mrinal Satish and Aparna 
Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciaty: The Indian Supreme 
68 Secrecy, national security and the vindication of constitutional law 
compromised by government secrecy, courts purport to undertake a 
balancing test to determine whether the public interest or individual 
rights at stake should override executive secrecy; however, government 
claims regarding the necessity of secrecy consistently prevail. 65 Defer-
ence to executive branch decision-making is deep-rooted in national 
security-related cases,66 and is consistent with India's history of granting 
the executive branch sole power to determine whether to disclose 
information in any number of contexts, including enforcement of its 
Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial rule in India.67 
In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, 68 the Indian Supreme Court 
considered whether to order the publication of background documents 
underlying a commissioned report on government corruption over which 
the government had claimed secrecy. Members of Parliament, including 
petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that the Home Minister refused dis-
closure to avoid government embarrassment.69 The Indian Supreme Court 
began with the need for transparency, noting that 'Sunlight is the best 
Court's Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT'L L. ScH. INDIA REV. 
51, 65 (2009) (describing the history of Indian courts deferring to executive 
decisions regarding security matters). 
65 E.g., People's Union for Civil Liberties & Am. v. Union of India & Ors., 
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India) (upholding denial of request for disclosure of 
information). 
66 This deference has been consistent, despite the adoption of right to 
information legislation in recent years and judicial statements about the import-
ance of government transparency. Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of 2003; 
INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in; e.g,, S.P. Gupta v. 
President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234, § 66 (India) ('The concept of an open 
government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be 
implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 
19(l)(a) [of the Indian Constitution]. Therefore, disclosure of information in 
regard to the functioning of Gove1nment must be the rnle and secrecy an 
exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so 
demands.'). 
67 India operfltes under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 (OSA), 
enforced in India by the British colonial government. Under the OSA, any 
disclosure of information - intentional or inadvertent - likely to affect the 
sovereignty, integrity or security of India is punishable by imprisonment for up to 
fourteen years. 
68 Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306 (India). The Court 
in Trivedi relies heavily on the balancing test articulated in S.P. Gupta, supra 
note 65, to find that government secrecy claims ought to be upheld despite rule 
of law concems. 
69 Trivedi, 4 S.C.C. 306, §§6, 8. 
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disinfectant. But it is equally important to be alive to the dangers that lie 
ahead.' 70 The Indian Supreme Court accepted with little question the 
government's claim and hypothesized that the public furor toward 
individuals named in the report - should it be published in full - could 
lead to harassment and violence. Based on its own speculative concerns 
that appear grounded in historical deference to executive decision-
making,71 the court upheld government secrecy claims.72 Similar reason-
ing has been used in other secrecy matters,73 bolstered by claims of 
consistency with English public interest immunity jurisp1'udence.74 The 
level of deference offered by the Indian Supreme Court is higher than 
that of any of the other nations considered here, but is seemingly more 
consistent with the recent state secrets cases in the US than that of the 
English courts in the Mohamed litigation.75 The Indian Supreme Court, 
consistent with its security-related jurisprudence, has consistently 
reverted to a formalistic analysis that offers a rhetorical nod to the rule of 
70 Id. § 19. 
71 See SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA'S SUPREME COURT, 
ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61-71, 90-91 (2009) (arguing that 
whereas social rights is considered an area in which the judiciary is expected to 
take an active role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional 
framers and Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary's ability to curb 
executive power), 
72 Id. §§ 16-20. 
73 E.g., People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India). The Court in this case upheld the govemment's 
secrecy claim over a report on nuclear reactors, reasoning that secrecy was 
sometimes necessary because '[i]f every action taken by the political or executive 
functionary is transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an 
enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect 
on the independence of the decision-maker'. See the Right of Information section 
of the People's Union opinion, id. 
74 See the Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section of the 
People's Union opinion, id. (citing Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 
865, which held that 'the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of 
the Evidence Act is the same as in English law'). 
75 There is no indication that the adoption of a Right to Infmmation statute in 
2005 has substantially affected the reasoning of the courts with regard to 
security-related secrecy, particularly since the statute contains a carve-out for 
national security matters. See The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005, 
INDIA CODE (2009 ), available at http://indiacode.nic.in. 
70 Secrecy, national security and the vindication of constitutional law 
law and individual rights, but no avenue of relief for those who seek to 
chip away at government secrecy.76 
CONCLUSION 
In the US, the state secrets cases illustrate what may be becoming the 
new normal in security-related jurisprudence: formalistic reasoning that 
allows the court to bow out of its counter-majoritarian role of protecting 
individual rights and justice. Certainly the approach taken by India and 
the US is not the only viable one - England and Israel are evidence of 
that. The Mohamed case illustrates that England's current application of 
the state secrets privilege - however historically deferential - reflects at 
least in some cases the prioritization of various rule of law principles by 
the English courts, including the need for open justice, government 
accountability, and the opportunity for redress by individual litigants. The 
flexible approach used by the English court to determine that secrecy 
ought not prevail in the Mohamed case is reassuring to those concemed 
with rights protection. Yet the larger specter of the US exerting pressure 
regarding the state secrets privilege serves as a waming that even though 
the US was not successful with regard to applying pressure on England,77 
US soft power may successfully pressure courts in nations where courts 
would otherwise apply a narrower privilege. 
Such a dynamic makes it all the more important that structural reform 
occur. Passage of strong state secrets reform legislation should become a 
76 See Satish and Chandra, supra note 64, at 63 (critiquing the Indian 
Supreme Court's terrorism jurispmdence for focusing on procedural and tech-
nical questions and abdicating its role as a prot~ctor of fundamental rights). 
77 The US government's displeasure at the English treatment of Binyam 
Mohamed's case motivated the British government to propose the stripping of 
judicial review over similar cases in which sensitive information may be 
disclosed. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN 
PAPER, 2011, Cm. 8194, § 2.91 (UK), available at www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2011/oct/uk-justice-and-security-green-paper.pdf. The Green Paper notes that 
such measures are necessary because '[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, the Government 
and its foreign government patiners have less confidence than before that the 
courts will accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that 
would result from disclosure'. Id. § 1.43; cf. United Kingdom House of Lords, 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Fourth Report, Justice and Security 
Green Paper, at §§ 99-103 (Mar. 27, 2012) (emphasizing the importance of 
courts in weighing government claims of the need for secrecy). 
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priority,78 and courts should resist being cowed by assertions that judicial 
involvement in security matters is unwarranted or undermines the safety 
of the nation.79 Although genuine access to the courts is no guarantee of 
substantive justice, substantive justice is unlikely to be achieved if the 
judiciary continues to retreat behind a wall of formalism. 
78 Arguments that high levels of deference are unwarranted continue to grow. 
E.g., See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security? 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417, 1424, 
1445-46 (2012); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls 
Infmmation in the National Security State? (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law 
Research Paper No. 10-53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l661964. 
79 Such assertions are sometimes offered by the judiciaty itself. E.g., 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 802 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(critiquing the level of judicial involvement in detention decisions endorsed by 
the Court and noting that, '[a]ll that today's opinion has done is shift responsibil-
ity for those sensitive foreign policy and national security decisions from the 
elected branches to the Federal Judiciary'). 
